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Abstract: Utilizing elementary geometric and probability considerations, we estimate the effect of crowd blocking in suicide bombing
events. It is shown that the effect is quite significant. Beyond a certain threshold, the expected number of casualties decreases with the
number of people in the arena. The numerical results of our model are consistent with casualty data from suicide bombing events in
Israel. Some operational insights are discussed. © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 52: 22–29, 2005.
Keywords: suicide bomber; crowd blocking; fragmentation
1. INTRODUCTION
Terror events that involve suicide bombers (SB) have
become a major concern to governments, particularly in
Israel, but also elsewhere in the world. In the past few years,
there were over 100 suicide bomb events in Israel alone that
ended with the attackers blowing up others, along with
themselves. Typical suicide bomb events occur in relatively
small, crowded areas, henceforth called arenas, such as
restaurants, buses, and bus stations.
One would expect that the number of casualties would
increase with the density of the crowd, although at a de-
creasing rate, and would decrease with the size of the arena
for a fixed number of people. The reason for the first
assertion is that a higher density of people increases the
probability that a random fragment of the bomb hits a
person, and therefore it also increases the expected number
of casualties. The second assertion seems reasonable, since
the effect of the bomb decreases with distance, and larger
arenas imply longer average distance from the SB to a
randomly selected person.
In this note, we show that this is not necessarily the
case. Crowd blocking has a significant effect on the
expected number of casualties. Crowd blocking occurs
when some persons are shielded from the fragments of
the bomb by other persons who stand between them and
the SB. The effect of crowd blocking is modeled and
quantified in this note. It is shown numerically that the
expected number of casualties is a unimodal function of
both the crowd density and the size of the arena. We also
obtain estimates for the expected number of casualties
that conform to data regarding casualties in SB attacks in
Israel [4]. The model presented here was motivated by
related research reported in [3], where the crowd density
in the arena is represented by a continuous parameter.
Here we present a discrete model, which we believe
better captures the physical aspects of the SB situation.
There is an abundance of publications on wound bal-
listics. They include books (e.g., [2,6]) and reports—
mostly by the U.S. Army Ballistics Research Laborato-
ries (e.g., [1]) and the International Wound Ballistics
Association [5]. However, most of these publications
address the clinical aspects associated with the physical
and biological effects that result from the impact of
kinetic energy projectiles on humans. These aspects are
beyond the scope of this paper which focuses on the
effect of mutual blocking. Some technical data in [2]
(e.g., Table 19, p. 113) are used in the next section to
determine some assumptions of the model.
2. THE SITUATION
A typical SB carries an explosive charge (EC) mounted
on a belt, which is concealed under a coat or a large shirt.
The EC contains explosive and small pieces of metal,
such as screws and nails. We assume that the SB attempts
to position himself as close to the center of the crowd as
possible. Then he sets off the bomb, and the metal
fragments disperse in a beam spray that hit people in the
vicinity. We consider only bomb fragment injuries
(which are the most severe ones) and not blast or blast-
related injuries (e.g., burns or cuts from shattered glass).
Also, due to the relatively small amount of explosiveCorrespondence to: M. Kress (mkress@nps.edu)
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(3–4 kg) we assume, in our base model, that the energy
of the fragments is such that a fragment may injure, at
most, one person [2,8]. Secondary injuries are typically
negligible. It is shown, however, that the model can be
modified to also account for secondary hits, which may
injure, with a certain probability, persons that stand im-
mediately behind an exposed person. The number of
effective fragments—those which are potentially effec-
tive—is roughly one half the number of fragments on the
belt. The other half is wasted on the SB himself. We
assume that the explosive and fragments are uniformly
distributed on the belt, which is depicted in our model as
a full circle. See Figure 1.
3. THE PHYSICAL MODEL
Let
N  number of effective fragments in the beam
spray,
R  range from the belt of the SB,
b  diameter of the suicide belt (the average
“diameter” of a person’s body),
  dispersion angle of the effective beam spray,
PH(R)  probability that an exposed person at range R
is hit.







The denominator in (1) is the total area of dispersion at
range R (see Appendix A).
A person is represented in the model as a cylinder of
diameter b and height cb, c  1. Its exposed area to the
fragments A is approximately a rectangle of width b and
height that is determined by the dispersion angle  (see Fig.
2). That is,
A  b Min2R tan 2 , cb. (2)
Assuming uniform and independent dispersion of frag-
ments, the probability that a person at range R is hit by at
least one fragment is







From (1) it follows that






 1  eAR. (4)
We assume that the effectiveness of the explosive and the
size of the arena are such that air resistance and gravitation
has no significant effect on the trajectory and energy of the
fragments. A fragment does not get any more harmless with
distance.
Figure 1. A suicide belt and its spray beam.
Figure 2. The exposed area.
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Some typical SB arenas, such as restaurants, may be
depicted as a circular area around the SB. Let R0 denote the
distance between the SB (the EC belt) and the boundary of
the arena. We assume that the crowd is distributed randomly
and uniformly in the arena.
For modeling purposes, it is convenient to view the
circular arena as a sequence of M concentric rings of width
b. Each person occupies a round “slot” of diameter b in a
certain ring. In particular, the SB is located in the central
slot (see Fig. 3). The maximum possible number of circles






, m 1, . . . , M, (5)
which is obviously independent of b. From now on we take
b  1. See Appendix B.
It can be verified (at least for M  200, which is much
more rings than we need for the SB scenario) that am is
integer only for m  1 (a1  6). Assume that in each ring
we pack, with possible small overlaps, km  am slots.





For example, the overlap factors for m  1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6
are 0, .04, .01, .04, .02, .01, respectively. For higher values
of M the dm gets even smaller since the nominator in (6) is
bounded by 1 and the denominator is (strictly) monotone
increasing in m. See Figure 4 for m  1, 2. Thus, the
overlaps are marginal and they can be removed by slightly
increasing the width of a ring. From now on we assume that





kn, m  1, . . . , M. (7)
K(M) is the maximum possible number of people in the
arena (excluding the SB). For example, if M  10, then
K(M)  6  13  19  26  32  38  44  51 
57  63  349.
Since we assume random homogeneous mixing in the
arena, the probability distribution of the number of people
lm in the mth ring is hypergeometric with parameters K(M)
and km. That is, the probability that lm out of L people in the
arena are in the mth ring is
Prlm
 kmlm  KM kmL lm 
 KML 
, (8)




4. THE EFFECT OF CROWD BLOCKING
The number of casualties depends on the spatial distribu-
tion of people in the arena. Some people may become
Figure 3. The arena.
Figure 4. Number of slots, k1  6, k2  13.
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human shields to others by blocking the fragments. As
shown in Figure 5, B1 totally shields (blocks) the target (T),
B2 partially shields it, and B3 provides no shield at all. We
estimate the effect of blocking by a 0–1 damage function,
similar to the widely used cookie-cutter function in combat
modeling and firing theory [8]. A target (person) is pro-
tected against a fragment that is moving its way if and only
if its center is shielded from the beam spray. In other words,
the target is safe if and only if there exists at least one
person that blocks the line-of-sight from the center of the
SB to the center of the target. B1 in Figure 6 provides total
shield for the target, while B2 provides none. Instead of
describing the situation in terms of persons, we will do it by
looking at the slots in the various rings. Thus, a person (T)
in ring m is protected if and only if there is at least one slot
in rings 1, . . . , m  1 such that (a) it intersects the
line-of-sight SB  T, and (b) it is occupied by a person.
Since the slots in each ring are packed, there exists in
each ring 1, . . . , m  1 a slot that intersects the line-of-
sight SB  T. It follows that T is safe if and only if at least
one of these m  1 slots is occupied by a person. Denote
the probability of the complement of this event—the prob-
ability that the target is exposed and vulnerable to the
explosion—by (m). It can be shown (see Appendix C)
that
m  	 
l1




It is easily seen that 1  (1)  (2) , . . . (M).
The expected number of casualties in the mth ring is
Em m m  PHm, (11)
where
PHm  1  eAm
 1  eN Min2m tan/2,c/4 sin/2m2  1 eDm. (12)





Next, we relax the assumption of complete crowd blocking and
assume that, in certain cases, a person whose path to the
bomber is obstructed by another may be subject to injury too.
Specifically, assume that secondary injuries may occur inde-
pendently, with probability q, to persons located right behind
exposed persons. Using the formula for total probability, it is
easily seen that the probability that a target in ring m stands
right behind an exposed target in ring m  1 is (m  1) 
(m), m  2, . . . , M. Therefore, the expected number Eˆm of
casualties in ring m is
Eˆ m Em m  1,m1  qm 
 qm  1	PHm otherwise.
(14)
Figure 5. Partial and complete blocking.
Figure 6. Crowd blocking.
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Figure 7. Expected number of casualties, M  10,   10
.
Figure 8. Expected number of casualties, M  10,   60
.
Figure 9. Expected number of casualties, M  20,   10
.
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5. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS
Figures 7–10 plot the values of E(M) as functions of the
crowd size L for the cases of perfect blocking (q  0) and
partial blocking (q  0.5). We examine two arena sizes,
M  10, 20, and two values of the spray beam angle,  
10° and 60°. We assume that N  100 fragments, and on
average the height of a person is 3.5 times his width (c 
3.5). For M  10 (K(M)  349), see Figures 7 and 8. For
M  20 (K(M)  1328), see Figures 9 and 10.
Figures 7–10 demonstrate that the effectiveness of the
suicide bomb does not necessarily increase with the size of
the crowd in the arena. Beyond a certain threshold, the
expected number of casualties gets smaller. This phenom-
enon is attributed to crowd blocking, which becomes more
significant as the density of the crowd increases. Note that
in the case of perfect blocking (q  0) the expected number
of casualties decreases to 6. This result is true in general
since the effect of the explosion is limited to the first ring
(with k1  6) when the arena is fully crowded. The
effectiveness of the explosion also depends on the size of
the spray beam angle. When this beam is narrow, the effect
is stronger than when it is wider. Note also that the effect of
secondary injuries is significant only when the arena be-
comes crowded. In a low-density arena only direct hits of
the fragments affect the number of casualties.
Figure 11 depicts the effect of the size of the arena on the
expected number of casualties. We assume a crowd of L 
100, and we vary the size of the arena between M  6 (the
Figure 10. Expected number of casualties, M  20,   60
.
Figure 11. Expected number of casualties as a function of the arena size,   10°.
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minimum-size arena that can contain 100 people) and M 
50. We assume perfect blocking.
From Figure 11 we see that the size of the arena affects
the damage in a nonmonotone way. For a certain crowd
(L  100 in our example), there is a capacity (M  25) for
which the damage is maximal.
While the results shown in Figures 7–11 seem to be
consistent with data regarding SB events (see Table 1), a
rigorous statistical analysis to confirm the numerical results
of the model is difficult, if not impossible. First, there is no
reliable record on the size of the crowd L in the arena at the
time of the event. This number can be estimated, at best,
based on interviews of eyewitnesses. Second, while frag-
ments are the main cause for fatalities in a SB event, some
victims may have been killed by blast effects. Also, al-
though some of the recorded injuries are related to mental
shock and secondary injuries, such as cuts and bruises from
debris, many of them may have been caused directly by the
fragments. Third, the number of effective fragments in a
suicide belt can also be only estimated. Fourth, the position
of the SB in the arena affects the results, too. Incidents with
relatively few casualties were typically consequences of a
partial successful interdiction of the SB, where a guard
identified the SB at the door, and as a result, the latter blew
himself up outside the arena.
If we assume that the number of fatalities plus 20% of the
injuries is a reasonable estimate for the number of casualties
of direct hits by fragments, then the 4 October 2003 SB
event (see Table 1) that occurred at the Maxim restaurant in
Haifa, Israel may confirm our model, e.g., the results in
Figures 9 and 11. The capacity of this restaurant (in the
sense of Fig. 3) is around 1000. According to the owner,
there where around 100 patrons in the restaurant at the time
of the event. The SB, a young woman from the West Bank,
was sitting close to the center of the hall. Based on our
Table 1. Casualties of SB events in Israel—2003 (source:[4]]).
Date Location Killed Injured
4 October 03 Haifa 21 60
8 September 03 Jerusalem 8 30
8 September 03 Zrifin Junction 9 20
19 August 03 Jerusalem 24 102
12 August 03 Ariel 2 4
12 August 03 Rosh Ha A’yn 1 9
19 June 03 Sde Trumot 1 0
11 June 03 Jerusalem 17 50
19 May 03 Afula 3 47
18 May 03 Jerusalem 7 20
30 April 03 Tel Aviv 3 60
30 March 03 Netanya 0 58
5 March 03 Haifa 17 40
5 January 03 Tel Aviv* 23 100
*Two simultaneous SB events.
Figure 12. The dispersion area.
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assumption above, the number of direct-hit casualties in this
event was 21  (.2)60  33 (see Table 1), L  100 and
M  18 (K(M)  1084). Assuming a narrow spray beam
(10°) and N  100 fragments, our model projects 29
casualties for q  0 and 31 casualties for q  0.5.
We may conclude that, from the SB point of view, there
is an optimal density of people in an arena for which the
effect of the suicide bomb is maximized. It seems that at
least in the Maxim restaurant event, the SB operated, un-
fortunately, very close to “optimality.” One possible oper-
ational conclusion from this analysis is that if a SB is
detected in a very dense crowd, dispersion of the crowd as
a result of an alarm can actually increase the number of
casualties. While, by running away, individuals who are
close to the SB may increase their survivability, many
others will become vulnerable. Perhaps the best policy
would be to reduce, as much as possible, the exposed area
to the fragments. This can be done, for example, by instruct-
ing the crowd to lie down, in a direction parallel to the beam
spray (away from the SB), and cover their head. This action
would reduce the average exposed area, in particular when
 is relatively small.
APPENDIX A
The beam spray is distributed vertically with angle between /2 and
/2 from the horizontal at the point of explosion—the center of the
sphere in Figure 12. An arc of size ds at range R is ds  R d. The surface
area of a complete circumferential strip at angle a is 2R cos R d  




2R2 cos  d  4R2 
0
/2





Consider Figure 13. The number of circles that can fit into the mth ring,
am, is determined by the angle m between the line that connects the POE
with the center of the circle and its tangent. That is, am  2/ 2m. But
sin m  (b/ 2)/mb  1/ 2m; therefore, m  arcsin(1/ 2m), and the
result follows.
APPENDIX C
Consider a certain person in ring m. Because of the uniform and
independent distribution of people in the arena, the probability that the first
of the other L  1 persons will not occupy a blocking slot is that he
chooses one of K(M)  m empty slots out of the K(M)  1 available. The
second person can choose from K(M)  m  1 empty slots out of
K(M)  2 available, and so on.
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